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Abstract 
 
Since both release resources from agricultural production, it is not surprising that decisions to 
work off the farm and to participate in the U. S. Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) are 
correlated. By incorporating these decisions into a heteroskedastic specification of a farm 
household income function, we identify their effects on mean income, as well as on the 
variability in income for groups of farm households participating in combinations of these 
activities. Our results indicate participation in CRP and off-farm work by the operator and the 
spouse increase farm household income, but these choices also decrease the variability in 
household income among participant households relative to that of other farm households with 
otherwise similar characteristics.  
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Introduction 
The dependence of farm households in the United States and elsewhere on income from non-
farm sources has increased steadily, narrowing, or actually reversing in some instances, the gap 
between incomes of farm and non-farm households (Offutt 2002). In the United States, off-farm 
income is now the largest component of farm household income, $120 billion at the start of the 
new millennium, compared with net income from farming of only $50 billion (Mishra, et al. 
2002).  
Until the mid-1980’s, these changes in the composition of farm household income 
occurred against the backdrop of a commodity-oriented U. S. farm policy. Through the 
conservation compliance provisions of the 1985 farm bill, environmental goals were elevated 
along side commodity policy objectives. Spending on an expanded number of provisions 
offering incentives to participate in environmentally-related programs was to rise by 80 percent 
under recent farm legislation—to a 10-year total of $38.6 billion. The Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP) is the largest Federal program targeting land use. Through this voluntary 
program, agricultural producers can receive annual rental payments and cost-share assistance to 
establish long-term, resource conserving covers on eligible farmland. To date, about 35 million 
acres have been removed from agricultural production and thus reduce soil erosion by an 
estimated 450 million tons per year, at an annual cost to the Federal government of about over $2 
billion (Farm Service Agency 2007).  
While total CRP payments are small compared with the income from off-farm work, the 
payments or income from each can be a significant source of reliable income to farm households 
unrelated to price and yield risk inherent in agricultural production. Since CRP and off-farm 
work remove substantial resources from agricultural production, the decisions may well be 
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interrelated, and may affect the allocation of other resources in farm production, as well as 
between the farm and the farm household. Phimister and Roberts (2006) find evidence that while 
fertilizer intensity may decline as off-farm labor increases, the use of crop protection inputs per 
hectare increases. Goodwin and Mishra (2004) show that off-farm work reduces the efficiency of 
agricultural production. By recognizing the correlation between the decisions to work off the 
farm and to participate in CRP in estimating a stochastic production frontier, Chang (2006) 
shows that operators’ off-farm work decisions (both separately and combined with participation 
in CRP) improve resource allocation between farm and productive activities by farm households.  
Our purpose in this paper is to determine how these same decisions may also affect farm 
household income. There are two major components to the analysis, and each has unique aspects. 
Huffman (1991, p.106) has underscored the importance of accounting for labor supply and other 
decisions that are likely to be determined endogenously with household income. Therefore, we 
first estimate a discrete choice model for CRP participation and off-farm work.  In modeling 
these three choices jointly, we extend the already considerable research to explain decisions to 
work off the farm by both farm operators and spouses,1 and to participate in programs such as 
the CRP (e.g., Isik and Yang 2004; Parks and Schorr 1997).  
                                                
Next, to account for the endogeneity among these decisions and income we include the 
estimated probabilities of participation in CRP and off-farm work in the equation for farm 
household income. By also specifying a heteroskedastic farm household income function, we 
identify any effect of these three decisions on both average farm household income and its 
variability (or inequality) among households with similar characteristics and participating in 
 
1The literature on off-farm work by the farm operator is summarized in Hallberg, et al. (1991). Other research 
documents the likelihood that off-farm work decisions of the operator and spouse are interrelated (e.g. Huffman and 
Lange 1989; Lim-Applegate, et al. 2002; and Ahearn, et al. 2006). 
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various combinations of these three activities. 2 Thus, through this specification we gain insights 
into how the reallocation of resources released from agriculture by each decision contributes 
differently to the farm household income and its distribution. We also identify how participation 
in agro-environmental programs such as the CRP contribute to the long-standing income 
objectives of more traditional agricultural policies.  
To proceed, we outline a conceptual framework to establish the linkage between the 
discrete choice model and farm household income, and to motivate our econometric specification. 
We then describe the data, discuss the results, and conclude with a brief policy discussion.  
Conceptual Framework 
 We assume that farm household decisions are made by the operator, m, and the spouse, s. 
There are fixed endowments of farmland ( A ) and time for the operator ( mE ) and spouse ( sE ). 
Time is allocated to leisure ( ), farm production ( ), and off-farm work ( . 
Land is allocated between crop production (A), and CRP (Ae). The household receives income 
from agricultural sales, off-farm work at respective off-farm wages ( ), CRP per acre 
payments (Pe), and decoupled farm payments, (M). Utility depends not only on farm household 
consumption (x) and leisure, but also the improvement in environmental quality (e) generated by 
land committed to CRP. Agricultural production, y, depends on land and labor, where 
 is a well-behaved concave production function. To reflect the risky 
environment in agricultural production, we assume that the commodity price, P, is random; 
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2 A similar heteroskedastic specification is used by Low and Ormiston (1991) and Mullahy and Sindelar (1995) to 
examine the effects of schooling and alcoholism on family income; neither accounts for endogeneity between the 
decisions and income. 
 3
Farm households maximize expected utility, subject to income, time, and acreage 
constraints: 
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Assuming an interior solution for all endogenous variables, except ( ), the first-order 
conditions for maximization are: 
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3 To make the analysis tractable, we assume marginal utilities of leisure and CRP land are independent: UAeL = ULAe = 
0 (e.g. Fabella 1989). 
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where Ui is the derivative of utility function w. r. t. argument i. Equations (8) and (9) provide 
optimal conditions for off-farm hours worked. If a corner solution obtains for either, the ratio of 
the expected marginal utility of leisure to the expected marginal utility of consumption may be 
greater than the off-farm wage. Similarly, the optimal CRP enrollment may be zero if the cost of 
participation is less than the benefit of participation (equation 7). After solving the equations for 
the endogenous variables, and substituting into equation (2), income can be expressed in terms of 
the exogenous variables: 
(12)      ),,,,,( 2 MPPwwxx esm ησ= .  
To retain all sample observations for empirical estimation, we adopt a reduced form approach 
similar to one by Goodwin and Holt (2002) in which (potentially unobservable) wages and CRP 
payments are replaced in equation (12) by their determinants. Since the participation decisions 
may be correlated with farm household income due to unobserved heterogeneity, we account for 
this endogeneity through an extension of the conventional endogenous treatment effect model by 
including predicted probabilities of each choice from the discrete choice model in the income 
function as proxies for their observed counterparts.  
Econometric Framework 
Decision Process  
To characterize the decision process, we specify each participation decision as a binary 
probit choice, but allow for correlation between each pair of choices. Each decision is assumed 
to be determined by the comparison of the net benefit between participation and non-
participation in each activity. If the latent binary choice variables (I1*, I2*, I3*) represent the 
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likelihood of participation in CRP, and off-farm work by the operator, and spouse, respectively, 
the reduced form participation equations are:  
(15)           I1=1 iff  I1*>0 otherwise I1=0 1111 '* eXHI +=
                I2=1 iff  I2*>0 otherwise I2=0 2222 '* eXHI +=
        ,        I3=1 iff  I3*>0 otherwise I3=0 3333 '* eXHI +=
where I1, I2 and I3 are dummy indicators for the observed decisions; H1, H2, and H3 and  X1, X2, 
and X3 are vectors of parameters and exogenous variables, respectively; and (e1, e2, e3) is 
assumed to be distributed trivariate normal with zero means, unit variances, and correlation 
coefficients between any pair of choices, ρij. Based on observed outcomes and the probabilities 
of the eight possible regimes, the log likelihood function is (Greene 2003): 
(16)        ],,,',','[loglog 233213311221333222111
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where  is the cumulative trivariate normal distribution for each regime. The constants, k1, k2 
and k3 are (2I1-1), (2I2-1), and (2I3-1), respectively. We estimate equation (16) with an approach 
based on the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator, which is unbiased for any number 
of replications and generates smaller variances than other simulators (Hajivassiliou, et al. 1996). 
(.)Φ
Incorporating the Effects of these Decisions in a Farm Household Income Function  
To account both for the endogeneity between the choices and income and for the effects 
of these choices on the variance in income among farms with similar characteristics, we specify a 
heteroskedastic farm household income function within a treatment effects model. Thus:  
(17)     uXHdXHdXHdXY +Φ+Φ+Φ+= )'ˆ()'ˆ()'ˆ(' 333322221111β
            εα )]'ˆ()'ˆ()'ˆ('[ 3333222211112/1 XHrXHrXHrKgu Φ+Φ+Φ+=
where Y is farm household income; X and β are vectors of factors affecting income and 
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parameters, respectively; u is the disturbance term with a zero mean and variance, Var (u) = σu2 = 
g(.), under the assumption that E (ε) = 0 and Var (ε) = 1. The function g½ (.) determines the 
variance in income, where K and α are vectors of explanatory variables and parameters, 
respectively. To capture the treatment effects (e.g. Vella and Verbeek 1999), the estimated 
marginal probabilities for CRP participation and for off-farm work by the operator and spouse, 
, and  from the choice model serve as proxies for three binary 
choice indicators in both Y and u. If 
)'ˆ( 11 XHΦ )'ˆ( 22 XHΦ )'ˆ( 33 XHΦ
ε  is standard normal, maximum likelihood methods provide 
consistent estimates of equation (17); the log-likelihood function is (Saha, et al. 1997):4  
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Data 
The farm household data are from the 2001 Agricultural Resource Management Survey 
(ARMS), conducted by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) of the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). By including data on the farm household (e.g. non-farm 
assets, non-farm income, demographics, etc.), the ARMS data provide the basis for assessing 
changes in the well being of farm households nationwide (Table 1). We limit our attention to the 
sample of farm households, excluding large corporate operations, etc. We also focus on crop 
farms; they contain the lion’s share of CRP participation.  
We also include data from additional sources. The economic characteristics of local areas, 
for example, are merged into our ARMS data set. These are county-level data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis income files in 2000, the Bureau of Economic Analysis employment files in 
2000, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the 1990 Census of Population, STF-3 file. Since the 
                                                 
4 The initial values are from the three-step method in Just and Pope (1979). 
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ARMS data lack information on land quality on the farm, variables representing land quality at 
the county level where the farm is located are used. We define land quality as the product of a 
variable for length of growing season and land capability class (i.e. Darwin and Ingram 2004). 
Another factor affecting CRP participation is the Environmental Benefits Index (EBI), 
which in part determines the maximum price that can be paid for land offered into the CRP. 
Since an EBI index for land was not available for each farm, we use data from Jaroszewski 
(2000) to approximate an EBI for major agricultural regions based on the percentage of land in 
the various conservation practices currently enrolled in CRP.  
Empirical Results 
Our empirical specifications are guided by theoretical results from above and previous 
literature (e.g. Goodwin and Mishra 2004, El-Osta, et al. 2004, and Ahearn et al. 2006). 
Although our focus is to identify the effects of these three choices on farm household income, we 
do test the null hypothesis that the three decisions are independent and discuss briefly the 
important factors affecting the three decisions.  
Tests for Interrelated Decisions  
 Based on the likelihood ratio test, we find substantial support for our joint decision model 
through a rejection of the null hypothesis that correlation coefficients between pairs of decisions 
are jointly equal to zero. Furthermore, CRP participation is positively correlated with off-farm 
work of the operator and spouse, and the coefficients are statistically significant.5 The positive 
                                                 
5 Full sample weights are used in the estimation to reflect appropriately the national characteristics of the crop farm 
households. However, this strategy does not account for any potential effect of the complex stratified sample design 
on the standard errors of the estimated coefficients. A delete-a-group jackknife procedure based on dividing the 
ARMS data into 15 nearly equal and mutually exclusive groups, with associated group (also called replicate) 
weights (Dubman 2000) has proven reliable for estimating variances of many financial statistics (most are linear 
functions of the data) in large samples, but much less is known about the performance in complex econometric 
models. It is not clear that the stratification scheme does not alter the likelihood functions beyond simple weights 
(Goodwin and Mishra 2006). They also argue that the appropriateness of applying the predefined jackknife replicate 
weights to a subsample of the ARMS data is unclear, and the numbers of observations in some of our subsamples is 
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correlation between the off-farm work by the operator and the spouse is consistent with those by 
Huffman and Lange (1989), Lim-Applegate, et al. (2002), and Ahearn, et al. (2006).  
The Two Off-Farm Work Decisions 
 As in much of the existing literature (e.g. Sumner 1982; Benjamin and Guyomard 1994), 
our results (Table 2) continue to confirm that older farmers (OP_AGE) are more likely to work 
off the farm; results are similar for the spouse (SP_AGE). Although education (OP_ED_C; 
SP_ED_C) has a positive effect on the probability of participation in off-farm work for both, on-
farm experience (OP_EXP; SP_EXP) has a negative effect. Farm operators raised on farms 
(RAISE_OP) are also less likely to work off the farm. These latter effects could reflect a strong 
preference for farm work and a farm lifestyle.  The likelihood of the spouse working off the farm 
declines as the number of children under six years of age in the household rises (H_SIZE06). 
Since returns to off-farm labor are likely to be less variable than farm returns (e.g. Mishra, et al. 
2002), the indication that the likelihood of off-farm participation is lower for farm operators 
willing to accept more risk (a negative coefficient on “RISK”, a variable that increases as a 
farmer is willing to accept more risk) is consistent with risk averse behavior.  
For both operator and spouse, the likelihood of participation in off-farm work declines 
with farm size (CROPSIZ1), and it is lower for vegetable or nursery operations (CROP456), the 
latter probably reflecting the opportunity cost of off-farm work for those producing high-value 
crops. The negative effects on the likelihood of participation of both net worth (NETWORT1) 
and participation in government programs (e.g. AMTA_A)6 other than CRP may reflect wealth 
                                                                                                                                                             
well below the limits at which the “…jackknife estimator faces structural problems in its application” (Dubman 
2000, p.11). This inability to correct for sample design to estimate standard errors suggests that one must exercise 
caution in extending statistical inferences to the population.  
6Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments, originally called Agricultural Market Transition Assistance 
(AMTA) payments, were initially designed to be “decoupled” from current production decisions. They are annual 
lump sum cash transfers announced in advance. However, at least in part because they are based on historical 
participation in commodity support programs, the jury is still out on whether they are pure transfers (e.g. Hennessy 
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or scale effects on off-farm labor supply (e.g. Goodwin and Mishra, 2004).7 These effects are 
more pronounced for the operator. The negative effect of TENANCY (measured by the 
proportion of acreage owned) reflects a greater commitment to agricultural production (cete
paribus). Finally, the strength of the local economy (measured by the proportion of jobs in 
manufacturing (MANUF)) increases the likelihood of off-farm w
ris 
ork for both.  
                                                                                                                                                            
The CRP Participation Decision 
The probability of participation in CRP increases with farm size (CROPSIZ1), but the 
probability of participation is lower for vegetable or nursery farms (CROP456), probably 
reflecting higher opportunity costs of removing land from high-value crop production (Table 2).  
Environmental characteristics also matter for CRP participation. For instance, farm 
households located in areas where the EBI scores for land currently enrolled are high are more 
likely to participate in CRP, ceteris paribus. Further, participation in CRP rises (falls) as the 
proportion of land in the surrounding county is classified as high (LQH_96) (low) (LQL_96) 
quality. Thus, CRP participation may be higher in areas where land is well suited for agriculture. 
While this result offers guidance about types of areas where CRP participation is high or low, it 
offers little information about the quality of land actually enrolled. To draw specific conclusions 
about the quality of land in CRP, we would need farm-specific information.    
Participation in CRP is related to the life-cycle of the farm operator. The likelihood of 
CRP participation increases with age (OP_AGE); as farmers get older, committing land to CRP 
may reduce labor requirements, and may help retain farmland assets for retirement, or for estate 
purposes. The positive correlation between farmers working off the farm and participation in 
 
1998).  
7There is reason to think that receipt of decoupled payments is endogenous. Using tests by Smith and Blundell (1986) 
and Vella (1993), Chang (2006), in related research involving just CRP participation and the operator’s off-farm 
work, found that decoupled payments (AMTA_A) are exogenous to the off-farm work decision.  
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CRP may reflect a desire to reduce operator labor requirements as land is taken out of production, 
and vice versa. The probability of CRP participation increases with farmer’s education 
(OP_ED_C), perhaps indicating that investments in human capital increase participation in CRP.  
As aversion to risk increases, we would expect the likelihood of participation in programs 
where payments are certain, such as CRP, to increase. This conclusion is supported by the 
negative sign on the variable “RISK” in Table 2 (e.g. high values for “RISK” are associated with 
farmers who prefer more risk). By allowing for decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), our 
theory is also consistent with the fact that decoupled payments, “AMTA_A”, reduce the 
likelihood of CRP participation. By receiving decoupled payments rather than enrolling land in 
CRP, a farmer also retains program base acreages and the option to convert land to non-
agricultural uses. Since commodity program-related loan deficiency payments (LDP_A) reduce 
farm income variability (particularly on the downside), these payments reduce risk averse 
farmers’ concerns for allocating resources to programs, such as CRP.        
Participation in state and local agriculturally-related programs also affects the likelihood 
for CRP participation. For example, if the farm is enrolled in a voluntary agricultural district, 
subject to a farmland preservation easement, or is located in an agricultural protection zone or an 
area zoned exclusively for agricultural use (the variable AGDIST), the farmer is less likely to 
participate in CRP. Farmers participate in these programs to maintain land in agricultural 
production in rapidly growing areas where there is competition for land for non-agricultural 
purposes. Consistent with Duke (2004), the likelihood of CRP participation falls as the 
proportion of population that is urban rises, reinforcing this explanation.  
Empirical Results of the Farm Household Income Function  
The estimated farm household income function is reported in Table 3, where the mean 
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and variance functions are specified in linear and exponential forms, respectively. The effects of 
participation in CRP and/or off-farm work on farm household income are embodied in the 
coefficients associated with the estimated marginal probabilities of participating in CRP and off-
farm work by the operator and spouse: PR_CRP, PR_OP, and PR_SP, respectively.8 Household 
income rises with all three probabilities, although the statistically insignificant effect for the 
probability of off-farm work by the spouse may be because many spouses may work off the farm 
part time or primarily to gain access to health insurance, or to gain personal skills (Mishra, et al. 
2002). 
Since this variance function is based on a heteroskedastic error specification, it 
determines the extent to which the variability of household income across farm households is 
systematically related to farm and farm household characteristics, as well as the likelihood of 
participation in CRP or off farm work. Thus, all else equal, the variance in household income 
across farm households is systematically lower for those farm households which are more likely 
to participate in CRP or off-farm work (e.g. the negative coefficients on the variables PR_CRP, 
PR_OP, and PR_SP in the variance equation in Table 3). These results on off-farm work square 
with those by Mishra, et al. (2002) who suggest that off-farm income helps diversify sources of 
income. There is also less variability in household income among these farms with some off-
farm income. This squares with the fact that income variability is higher among those farms 
where the spouse is a home maker (SP_HMAK).  
The performance of the human capital variables seem consistent with the standard results 
found in the human capital and earnings literature (Low and Ormiston 1991). Operators retired 
from farming (OP_RET) have lower household incomes, but incomes are less variable. Average 
                                                 
8 Based on a likelihood ratio test, we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the predicted probabilities 
specified in both the mean and variance functions are all zero. These probabilities do affect the mean and variance in 
household income differently. 
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farm household income is lower where operators have more experience (OP_EXP), but there is 
also less variability in incomes across farms in this group. This former result squares with the 
fact that farmers with more experience are less likely to work off the farm or participate in CRP. 
However, while those farmers committed to farming may have somewhat lower average incomes, 
this latter result may speak to the value of farm experience in dealing effectively with the 
inherent variability of returns from farming. Furthermore, the characteristics of the spouses also 
affect household income. Household incomes increase with the spouses’ educational levels 
(SP_ED_C), but incomes are more variable as the age of the spouse increases, all else equal.  
Also consistent with expectation, larger farms (CROPSIZ1) or farmers owning a large 
share of farmland (TENANCY) have higher farm household income. However, this probably 
means that a larger share of household income comes from farm sources—thus explaining, at 
least in part, why both of these variables contribute to the variability in household income across 
farms in the group. Consistent with these findings is that income variability is somewhat higher 
for farms in areas where there is a high proportion of high quality land (LQH_96). While these 
may be productive soils, yields may be more responsive to weather at both extremes.  
Farmers receiving (AMTA_A) payments also have higher average farm household 
incomes, which in part could be explained by the fact that decoupled payments are, in large 
measure, income transfers. Regardless of whether decoupled payments are pure transfers or have 
some modest effect on production decisions, it is not surprising that there is less variability in 
farm household among households receiving them. The financial status of the farm household 
also determines the farm household income. As the debt to asset ratio rises (DEBT_RAT) 
average farm income falls, but the variability of household income for farms with otherwise 
common characteristics falls, and the effect is significant.  
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From this discussion, it is evident that by controlling for the endogeneity of these three 
decisions, we are able to distinguish the direct effects of farm and household characteristics, 
other government programs, and local economic conditions on household income and its 
distribution from the indirect effects of these same factors through their effects on the probability 
of engaging in off-farm work or of participating in CRP. Information in Table 4 underscores the 
importance of these combined indirect effects.  
The mean probabilities of participation in CRP and off-farm work differ substantially 
across the groups of farms, but they differ in predictable ways (Table 4).  More important, any 
change in policy, etc. that affects substantially the probability of participation in CRP or off-farm 
work (even for non-participants) will affect household incomes for all groups, and variability of 
income across farms within a group. When combined, the indirect effects are substantial.  
For example, after setting those factors that directly affect household income at the group 
means, the probability of the operator working off the farm accounts for anywhere from 22 
percent of estimated farm household income (for the group where only the operator works off the 
farm) to 9 percent of mean income (for the group only participating in CRP). Similarly, by 
accounting for the probability of the operator working off the farm, the estimated standard 
deviation in income falls by between 11 percent and 27 percent among farms in the four groups 
of farms where the operator actually works off the farm. While it is important to document the 
size of these indirect effects, they are hardly surprising given the documented importance of 
income from non-farm sources. 
In contrast, the proportion of mean income accounted for by the probability of the spouse 
working off the farm is much smaller, ranging from only 1 percent to 3 percent across the nine 
groups. This might also be expected, but in percentage terms, the reduction in the standard 
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deviation in income across farms within each group is much larger, ranging from a high of 24 
percent and 25 percent for the two groups in which both the operator and spouse work off the 
farm, to a low of 9 percent for the two groups in which neither works off the farm.  
Finally, although annual CRP payments are at most 1 percent to 2 percent of income to 
farm households from non-farm sources, the effect of the likelihood of participation in CRP for 
some sub-groups is substantially larger. For the four groups participating in CRP, the probability 
of participation accounts for from 31percent (group participating only in CRP) to 18 percent of 
estimated farm household income. For the four groups not participating in CRP, the estimated 
probabilities of participation in CRP account for only 4 percent to 10 percent of mean income. 
Since CRP payments are predictable over the length of the contracts, it is also not surprising that 
by accounting for the probability of CRP participation, the standard deviation in income falls 
between 22 percent and 27 percent among farms in the four groups participating in CRP. 
Summary and Conclusions 
 In this paper, we develop an improved understanding of the interactions between the farm 
business and the farm household, particularly relative to decisions to participate in the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the largest U. S. agro-environmental program targeting 
land use. Importantly, we find that in order to explain participation in CRP, one must also 
account for the correlation between the decisions of farm operators and their spouses to work off 
the farm and the decision to participate in CRP. Moreover, by extending these results, we also 
demonstrate that these three decisions interact with socio-economic characteristics of the farm 
and farm household to affect the well-being of farm households, as measured by farm household 
income, and its variability among farm households with common characteristics. 
Participating in CRP depends on characteristics of the farm, the farm operator (including 
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age, experience, and risk attitudes), land quality, and local economic conditions. There are also 
differences in participation by major ERS production regions. Off-farm work decisions by the 
farm operator and spouse are related to many of these same factors, although the direction and 
magnitude of some of the effects are different.  All three decisions are affected by participation in 
other Federal farm programs. Participation in CRP is affected by state and local programs for 
farmland retention, etc. Policy implications of these results are elaborated in the text.   
It is not surprising that many of the same factors that affect the decisions to participate in 
CRP and to work off the farm also affect both farm household income and its variability 
compared with farm households in which the other farm and household characteristics are similar. 
After controlling for the endogeneity between these decisions and farm household income, we 
find that participation in CRP and off-farm work by both the operator and the spouse increase 
average household income, but they decrease the variability of household income across 
households with other similar characteristics. These results square with our expectations, since 
income from both CRP and off-farm work is likely to be less variable than income from farm 
sources, and they have important implications for farmers trying to adjust to a more market-
oriented farm policy environment. In addition to increasing the program’s environmental benefits, 
changes in agricultural policy that lead to increased participation in CRP are also likely to lead to 
important changes in the level and distribution of farm household income. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Farm and Farm Household Characteristics     
Variable Names Variable Definitions Mean  St. Dev. 
Dependent Variables    
OP If the operator worked off the farm (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.52 0.50 
CRP If the household enrolled in CRP or CREP (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.23 0.42 
SP If the spouse worked off the farm (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.57 0.50 
INCOME Total principle household income ($1,000) 67.98 106.82 
Operator and Spouse Characteristics   
OP_AGE Age of the operator 55.51 13.16 
OP_RET If the operator was retired (=1), otherwise (=0) 0.12 0.32 
OP_ED_C Education of the operator (year) 13.01 2.45 
OP_EXP Years the operator has worked on farm job 24.45 14.95 
RISK Risk preference rating of the operator; =1 if risk averse, 10 if 
risk loving 4.45 2.41 
RAISE_OP If the operator was raised on the farm (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.78 0.41 
SP_AGE Age of the spouse 53.43 12.84 
SP_ED_C Education of the spouse (year) 13.35 2.09 
SP_EXP Years the spouse has worked on farm job 24.45 14.95 
RAISE_SP If the spouse was raised on the farm (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.57 0.50 
SP_HMAK If the spouse is a home maker (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.27 0.44 
Farm and Household Characteristics   
CROP17 If a cash grain farm, (=1),otherwise (=0)  0.69 0.46 
CROP456 If a vegetable, fruit, or nursery farm, (=1),otherwise (=0)  0.22 0.42 
NETWORT1 Household net-worth value ( $100,000) 4.72 16.24 
DEBT_RAT Ratio of total debt to total assets 0.13 0.22 
NFASST1 Principle operator household non-farm assets ($10,000) 13.96 22.49 
TENANCY Ratio of owned acres over total operated acres   0.96 2.10 
AMTA_A Per acre AMTA payment  5.38 12.73 
LDP_A Per acre LDP payment 8.37 19.16 
CROPSIZ1 Operated acres (divided by 1,000) 0.33 0.70 
H_SIZE Number of household members 2.84 1.24 
H_SIZE06 Number of children younger than 6 years of age 0.14 0.48 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (con't)     
Variable Names Variable Definitions Mean  St. Dev. 
Environmental Characteristics   
LQH_96 Index of high quality land of 1996 0.33 0.25 
LQL_96 Index of low quality land of 1996 0.23 0.19 
EQIP If participate in EQIP (=1), otherwise(=0) 0.0032 0.0566 
EBI Environmental benefit index 61.59 3.93 
Location and Local Economic Conditions   
URBAN Percent of labor market area’s population living in urban areas 56.51 21.86 
MANUF LMA’s employment in manufacturing (%), lagged one year 13.78 6.89 
TRADE LMA’s employment in wholesale and retail trade (%), lagged 
one year 20.30 2.34 
AGDIST If participates in local agricultural preservation program (=1); 
otherwise (=0) 0.04 0.20 
REGN1 If located in Heartland (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.29 0.45 
REGN3 If located in Northern Great Plains (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.07 0.25 
REGN567 If located in Eastern Uplands, Southern Seaboard, or Fruitful 
Rim (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.30 0.46 
REGN9 If located in Mississippi Portal (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.05 0.22 
Note: Data are for crop farms and are from the 2001 ARMS Survey.    
Variables are weighted by the full sample weights; sample size is 2,102.   
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Table 2: Trivariate Probit Model Estimation   
Variablea Coefficient St. Dev. t-value
 For OP Choice Equation 
Constant -3.67 0.70 -5.26
OP_AGE 0.24 0.02 11.72
OP_AGESQ -2.59 0.18 -14.18
OP_ED_C 0.06 0.01 4.39
OP_EXP -0.05 0.01 -5.29
OP_EXPSQ 0.00 0.00 4.24
H_SIZE 0.00 0.03 -0.06
CROPSIZ1 -0.55 0.03 -17.43
RAISE_OP -0.47 0.10 -4.56
MANUF 0.01 0.01 2.53
TRADE -0.04 0.01 -3.04
AMTA_A -0.01 0.00 -2.85
LDP_A 0.00 0.00 -1.07
RISK -0.03 0.01 -1.70
NETWORT1 -0.01 0.00 -2.07
SP_HMAK 0.49 0.08 5.98
CROP456 -0.88 0.10 -8.91
REGN3 0.04 0.15 0.27
REGN567 -0.16 0.08 -2.04
TENANCY -0.04 0.03 -1.60
 For CRP Choice Equation 
Constant -5.70 1.48 -3.85
OP_AGE 0.03 0.00 9.57
OP_ED_C 0.08 0.02 4.85
LQH_96 0.54 0.23 2.35
LQL_96 -0.96 0.34 -2.79
EQIP 1.11 0.40 2.77
AGDIST -1.18 0.26 -4.55
EBI 0.06 0.02 2.49
AMTA_A -0.03 0.00 -5.92
LDP_A -0.01 0.00 -5.24
RISK -0.06 0.02 -3.14
CROP456 -1.96 0.26 -7.48
CROPSIZ1 0.23 0.04 5.56
REGN1 0.19 0.11 1.68
REGN567 -0.30 0.15 -2.03
REGN9 1.31 0.27 4.77
URBAN -0.01 0.00 -7.45
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Table 2: Trivariate Probit Model Estimation (con't) 
Variablea Coefficient Std. Dev. t-value
 For SP Choice Equation 
Constant -2.84 0.73 -3.89
SP_AGE 0.13 0.03 4.67
SP_AGESQ 0.00 0.00 -6.92
SP_ED_C 0.16 0.02 9.02
SP_EXP -0.01 0.00 -1.88
H_SIZE -0.10 0.03 -2.99
H_SIZE06 -0.26 0.09 -2.90
CROPSIZ1 -0.14 0.05 -2.60
RAISE_SP 0.14 0.07 1.94
MANUF 0.02 0.01 2.69
AMTA_A 0.00 0.00 -1.24
LDP_A 0.00 0.00 -0.39
NETWORT1 0.00 0.00 -0.99
CROP456 -0.88 0.09 -9.45
REGN3 0.14 0.17 0.86
REGN567 0.12 0.08 1.64
 Correlation Coefficients 
RHO(OP,CRP) 0.17 0.05 3.16
RHO(OP,SP) 0.25 0.05 5.28
RHO(CRP,SP) 0.12 0.06 2.00
Log-likelihood -2792.44
LR Test* 53.86   
a Variables are defined in Table 1. 
b The null hypothesis is: RHO(OP,CRP) = RHO(OP,SP )= RHO(CRP,SP) = 0. 
 The critical value is: x20.95,3 =7.8.   
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Table 3: Estimated Stochastic Household Income Function 
Variablea Coefficient St. Dev. t-value
Constant 0.24 20.07 0.01
OP_RET -14.78 4.30 -3.44
OP_EXP -0.28 0.15 -1.93
SP_AGE -0.07 0.23 -0.32
SP_ED_C 4.29 0.83 5.16
CROPSIZ1 7.39 2.99 2.47
TENANCY 10.60 2.40 4.42
CROP17 -5.14 4.43 -1.16
AMTA_A 0.35 0.08 4.20
DEBT_RAT -5.85 8.56 -0.68
URBAN 0.16 0.08 1.99
TRADE -1.02 0.64 -1.58
REGN567 6.93 4.26 1.63
PR_CRP 24.29 9.29 2.62
PR_OP 18.40 9.95 1.85
PR_SP 2.89 12.59 0.23
Constant 3.29 0.51 6.44
OP_RET -1.02 0.14 -7.04
OP_EXP -0.02 0.00 -5.75
SP_AGE 0.02 0.00 4.61
SP_HMAK 0.33 0.08 4.44
CROPSIZ1 0.18 0.03 6.30
TENANCY 0.20 0.02 10.28
AMTA_A -0.01 0.00 -5.14
DEBT_RAT 0.22 0.06 3.74
NFASST1 0.02 0.00 18.68
LQH_96 0.26 0.15 1.79
URBAN 0.01 0.00 4.31
REGN567 0.17 0.08 2.13
PR_CRP -1.18 0.20 -5.78
PR_OP -0.28 0.20 -1.42
PR_SP -0.59 0.20 -2.90
σ = 6.64 Log L = -13,646b LR Test = 531 x20.95,6 =12.6
bThe null hypothesis of the LR test is: PR_CRP=PR_OP=PR_SP= 0.
aVariables defined in Table 1; PR_CRP, PR_OP,PR_SP predicted probabilities of choices.
Mean Function
Variance Function
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Table 4: Effects of Participation in CRP and Off-farm Work on Total Household Income and its Distribution
Groupa Mean Std.  Dev. CRP OP Off-Farm SP Off-Farm Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
ALL 62.4 55.3
(1,1,1) 72.5 45.4 0.46 0.72 0.73 18 -24 18 -11 3 -24
(1,1,0) 69.7 54.9 0.54 0.60 0.49 23 -27 16 -9 2 -15
(1,0,1) 55.4 38.8 0.43 0.35 0.49 23 -22 12 -5 3 -16
(1,0,0) 54.5 42.4 0.53 0.26 0.28 31 -27 9 -4 1 -9
(0,1,1) 68.6 53.0 0.16 0.70 0.76 6 -9 19 -10 3 -25
(0,1,0) 59.3 70.1 0.10 0.71 0.53 4 -6 22 -10 3 -17
(0,0,1) 65.6 50.6 0.15 0.44 0.68 6 -8 12 -6 3 -22
(0,0,0) 51.5 66.8 0.18 0.27 0.28 10 -10 10 -4 2 -9
aA "1" indicates that farms participate in CRP, the operator works off the farm, and the spouse works off the farm, respectively.
bThese contributions are calculated with all other variables at the group means. 
% of Mean and Standard Deviation in Farm Household Income 
Mean Probability of Participation in:Income ($1,000) CRP SP Off-Farm WorkOP Off-Farm Work
Farm Household Accounted for by the Probabilities of Participation in: 
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